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This	  paper	  explores	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  international	  affairs	  during	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  
Viewed	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  businessmen	  and	  diplomats,	  the	  Railway	  was	  an	  
expensive	  venture	  with	  considerable	  economic	  and	  strategic	  potential.	  This	  report	  
provides	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  Railway	  project	  amid	  growing	  apprehension	  in	  Europe	  
and	  Great	  Britain	  about	  German	  designs.
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The	  Baghdad	  Railroad	  
It	  is	  unpleasant	  to	  contemplate	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  railway	  traversing	  the	  
whole	  of	  Asia	  Minor	  and	  terminating	  in	  the	  Persian	  Gulf,	  in	  which	  Great	  
Britain	  takes	  no	  part	  or	  share.1	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  classic	  tone	  of	  understatement,	  Sir	  Nicholas	  Roderick	  O'Conor,	  British	  
Ambassador	  to	  Turkey,	  was	  expressing	  alarm	  and	  outrage	  in	  his	  1901	  letter	  to	  the	  
British	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  Affairs.	  
The	  negotiations	  for	  the	  Baghdad	  railway	  officially	  begin	  in	  1898	  in	  
Constantinople	  when	  Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  visited	  the	  Sultan	  Abdul	  Hamid	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  
capital.	  From	  the	  German	  perspective,	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  was	  a	  chance	  to	  
challenge	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  the	  large	  British	  naval	  force.	  The	  goal	  was	  for	  the	  
railway	  to	  become	  the	  fastest	  way	  to	  reach	  Asia	  from	  Europe,	  directly	  challenging	  
the	  British	  navy	  and	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  This	  railway	  also	  concerned	  the	  British	  because	  
of	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  railway	  becoming	  a	  dominant	  trade	  route	  and	  connection	  to	  
India.2	  	  
However,	  there	  were	  other	  perspectives,	  too.	  The	  German	  railway	  engineer	  
known	  as	  the	  “Father	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway,”	  Wilhelm	  von	  Pressel	  did	  not	  
understand	  why	  the	  railroad	  had	  become	  such	  an	  object	  of	  contention	  in	  both	  the	  
                                                  
1	  Gooch,	  G	  P,	   and	  Harold	  W.	  V.	   Temperley.	  British	  Documents	  on	  the	  Origins	  of	   the	  War,	  1898-­‐1914.	  
2 Peter	  Hopkirk,	  Like	  Hidden	  Fire,	  21-­‐22	  
 
 2	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  Europe.3	  According	  to	  Pressel,	  the	  railway	  was	  “an	  ordinary	  
transaction”	  that	  “benefited	  both	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  the	  nation	  that	  built	  it.”4	  	  
This	  paper	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  context	  prior	  to	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  Railway.	  	  Then,	  the	  report	  will	  look	  at	  the	  Railway’s	  importance	  
through	  the	  eyes	  of	  key	  personalities	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  construction.	  	  The	  report	  will	  
conclude	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  railroad	  transportation	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  and	  with	  ideas	  for	  further	  research.	  	  
	  
Part	  I:	  Historical	  Setting	  Surrounding	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Railway	  
The	  Development	  of	  the	  Modern	  Railway	  
The	  invention	  of	  the	  steam	  engine	  and	  its	  adaptation	  to	  a	  mechanical	  device	  
that	  could	  move	  from	  place	  to	  place	  brought	  about	  social	  and	  economic	  
changes	  in	  history	  of	  mankind	  comparable	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  wheel	  at	  the	  
dawn	  of	  the	  Stone	  Age.5	  
	  
Before	  discussing	  the	  details	  of	  the	  Berlin-­‐Baghdad	  railroad	  specifically,	  it	  is	  
a	  helpful	  exercise	  to	  discuss	  both	  the	  development	  of	  the	  locomotive	  and	  a	  brief	  
history	  of	  Ottoman	  railways.	  The	  origin	  of	  steam	  railways	  is	  related	  to	  the	  growing	  
coal	  industry	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  Between	  1700	  and	  1830	  the	  production	  of	  
                                                  
3	  McMurry,	  Frank	  M.	  The	  Geography	  of	  the	  Great	  War.	  New	  York:	  Macmillan,	  1919.	  
http://freepages.military.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~worldwarone/WWI/TheGeographyOfTheGreatW
ar/	  ,18	  
4	  McMurry,	  18.	  
5	  Cookridge,	  E	  H.	  Orient	  Express,	   the	  Life	  and	  Times	  of	   the	  World's	  Most	  Famous	  Train.	  New	  York:	  
Random	  House,	  1978,	  3. 
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coal	  grew	  from	  3	  million	  to	  30	  million	  tons.6	  Coal	  reemerged	  as	  a	  primary	  source	  of	  
energy	  after	  the	  water	  wheel’s	  use	  decreased	  after	  1810.	  This	  is	  significant	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  rail	  because,	  with	  the	  increased	  demand	  for	  coal	  in	  the	  market,	  
the	  need	  for	  new	  innovations	  to	  transport	  the	  coal	  grew	  steadily.7	  The	  first	  metal	  
surface	  rails	  were	  produced	  to	  transport	  tubs	  of	  coal	  underground	  and	  overland.	  
Coal	  was	  carried	  and	  distributed	  on	  these	  “four-­‐foot	  waggonways”	  by	  horses	  as	  
early	  as	  1760.	  “By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  waggonways	  were	  firmly	  
established	  as	  part	  of	  Britain’s	  transport	  system.	  Their	  contribution	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  
the	  coal	  industry-­‐	  in	  facilitating	  the	  extension	  of	  coal	  working	  by	  containing	  rising	  
marginal	  costs-­‐	  had	  been	  an	  important	  one.”8	  	  
Transport	  improvements	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  economic	  growth	  of	  any	  
economy.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  railways	  were	  seen	  as	  secondary	  to	  water	  transport	  with	  
the	  goal	  of	  serving	  only	  to	  deliver	  rails	  to	  the	  water.	  However,	  as	  new	  technological	  
innovations	  were	  introduced,	  such	  as	  the	  steam	  locomotive,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  railway	  
was	  seen	  “as	  an	  independent	  transport	  facility.”9	  The	  eighteenth	  century	  Industrial	  
Revolution	  and	  development	  of	  the	  railroad,	  which	  began	  in	  Britain,	  became	  a	  
turning	  point	  for	  many	  nations	  around	  the	  world.	  From	  the	  world’s	  first	  steam	  
locomotive	  that	  ran	  in	  Northeast	  England	  between	  Stockton	  and	  Darlington,	  just	  
                                                  
6 Kirby,	  M	  W.	  The	  Origins	  of	  Railway	  Enterprise:	  The	  Stockton	  and	  Darlington	  Railway,	  1821-­‐1863.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1993.,	  9.	  
7	  Kirby,	  9.	  
8	  Kirby,	  15.	  
9	  Kirby,	  17. 
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eleven	  miles,	  in	  September	  1825,	  to	  the	  thousand	  mile	  tracks	  developed	  in	  the	  
1830s	  in	  America,	  the	  Railroad	  Age	  spurred	  massive	  excitement	  around	  the	  world.10	  
“The	  invention	  of	  locomotives	  further	  facilitated	  the	  advancement	  of	  
European	  colonizing	  nations	  in	  Asia	  and	  Africa”	  for	  many	  reasons.11	  “Railways	  did	  
not	  only	  fuel	  the	  advancement	  of	  European	  colonizers,”	  but	  also	  increased	  the	  speed	  
and	  urgency	  with	  which	  investors	  looked	  at	  the	  world’s	  global	  business	  potential.	  
The	  business	  of	  railroading	  both	  made	  and	  ruined	  fortunes,	  Investors	  viewed	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  as	  a	  new	  venue	  for	  business,	  “arguably	  very	  productive	  for	  both	  
sides.”	  
In	  understanding	  the	  politics	  at	  play	  in	  the	  new	  locomotive	  business,	  the	  
perspective	  of	  investors	  and	  government	  on	  all	  sides	  prove	  illuminating.	  Railroading	  
became	  very	  political,	  particularly	  Ottoman	  railways.	  The	  first	  foreign	  
entrepreneurs,	  who	  wanted	  to	  work	  in	  the	  railroad	  business	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  
were	  regarded	  with	  little	  care	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  government.	  Only	  later,	  after	  
struggling	  with	  financial	  difficulties	  did	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  value	  finding	  a	  
way	  to	  connect	  its	  empire	  and	  consolidate	  power.12	  
During	  the	  reign	  of	  Sultan	  Abdulaziz	  (1861-­‐1876),	  “the	  Ottomans	  laid	  the	  
groundwork	  for	  the	  line	  between	  Istanbul	  and	  Anatolia,	  with	  the	  route	  starting	  from	  
                                                  
10 Cookridge,	  E.	  H.	  1978.	  Orient	  Express,	  the	  life	  and	  times	  of	  the	  world's	  most	  famous	  train.	  New	  York:	  
Random	  House,	  4.	  
11 Hülagü,	  M.	  Metin.	  2010.	  The	  Hejaz	  Railway:	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  hope.	  New	  York:	  Blue	  Dome	  
Press.,	  1.	  
12 Hülagü,	  xii.	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the	  Asian	  side	  of	  Istanbul,	  in	  Kadikoy,	  all	  the	  way	  to	  Pendik	  in	  1871.”13	  The	  sultan	  
wanted	  to	  serve	  the	  densely	  populated	  region	  of	  Marmara	  and	  to	  extend	  the	  rail	  to	  
Mesopotamia.	  However,	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  was	  unable	  to	  finance	  the	  project	  
itself.	  The	  first	  official	  involvement	  by	  foreign	  investors	  occurred	  in	  April	  1880,	  
when	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  granted	  a	  British	  company	  the	  rights	  to	  operate	  a	  
railway	  project	  in	  Ottoman	  territory.14	  	  
In	  subsequent	  years	  two	  thirds	  of	  all	  foreign	  capital	  invested	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  was	  for	  railway	  projects.	  “From	  1856	  to	  1922,	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  built	  
8,434	  kilometers	  of	  railways	  with	  funds	  secured	  from	  European	  sources	  in	  
Anatolian	  and	  Rumeli.”15	  The	  only	  railway	  that	  was	  financed	  only	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  
government	  was	  the	  Hejaz	  railway.	  The	  Hejaz	  and	  Baghdad	  railways	  were	  the	  two	  
most	  important,	  and	  political	  railways	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  	  
While	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway,	  the	  Hejaz	  Railway	  
provides	  an	  interesting	  source	  of	  comparison.	  What	  was	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  railways	  
on	  the	  Ottomans	  themselves?	  The	  investment	  itself,	  the	  construction	  process,	  and	  
how	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  railroads	  affected	  the	  population	  and	  markets	  of	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire.	  Was	  the	  development	  of	  railways	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
beneficial	  to	  the	  Ottomans	  in	  terms	  of	  agricultural	  production,	  exports,	  and	  
transportation	  of	  goods,	  people	  and	  supplies?	  Did	  the	  people	  adjust	  to	  the	  new	  
construction	  projects?	  Or	  did	  the	  railways	  only	  serve	  investors	  and	  European	  
                                                  
13 Hülagü,	  xii.	  
14 Hülagü,	  xii.	  
15 Hülagü,	  xv.	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businessmen?	  When	  analyzing	  a	  project	  of	  this	  scope,	  any	  consequences	  of	  the	  
development	  (particularly	  in	  an	  empire	  not	  known	  for	  experiencing	  
industrialization	  like	  the	  West)	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  mind.	  	  
Most	  railway	  development	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  was	  contracted	  out	  to	  
European	  powers	  such	  as	  Germany,	  Austria,	  France,	  or	  the	  British.	  After	  the	  
Crimean	  War	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  towards	  railways	  shifted:	  the	  
Sultan	  and	  army	  realized	  that	  the	  deficiency	  of	  the	  empire	  was	  in	  its	  transportation.	  
The	  Ottoman	  Empire	  possessed	  vast	  territory	  as	  well	  as	  waterways	  for	  transport,	  
yet	  these	  were	  scattered	  all	  over	  the	  empire	  with	  no	  means	  for	  connecting	  them.	  “In	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  empire,”	  their	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  transportation	  
“was	  the	  construction	  of	  railway	  lines”	  in	  the	  same	  vein	  as	  the	  Roman	  Empire	  
building	  surfaced	  roads.16	  	  
The	  Ottoman	  Empire	  had	  excellent	  ports	  and	  a	  wealth	  of	  ability	  when	  it	  came	  
to	  transportation	  to	  and	  from	  its	  shores.	  However,	  this	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  
Bosphorous	  Straits,	  which	  divided	  Constantinople,	  and	  the	  Sea	  of	  Marmara	  and	  the	  
Black	  Sea.	  This	  was	  an	  important	  link	  from	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  Europe	  and	  Asia,	  
however	  the	  extensive	  use	  of	  these	  ports	  for	  lasting	  value	  was	  limited	  due	  to	  the	  
lack	  of	  dependable	  roads.	  	  
The	  topic	  of	  railroads	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  can	  be	  studied	  from	  many	  
different	  angles,	  in	  terms	  of	  trade	  and	  the	  economy	  or	  as	  related	  to	  the	  military	  and	  
                                                  
16 Karkar,	  Yaqub	  N.	  1972.	  Railway	  development	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1856-­‐1914.	  New	  York:	  
Vantage	  Press.,	  62.	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international	  diplomacy.	  Methods	  of	  transporting	  goods	  and	  materials	  were	  
essential	  to	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  in	  Europe	  with	  new	  mass	  production	  in	  
factories	  and	  mills	  and	  new	  discoveries	  of	  raw	  materials.17	  The	  economic	  and	  
political	  history	  of	  railroads	  not	  only	  increased	  speed	  and	  ease	  of	  transportation,	  
but	  also	  extended	  the	  political	  reach	  of	  nations.	  The	  Berlin-­‐Baghdad	  Railroad	  proves	  
to	  be	  an	  interesting	  case	  in	  terms	  of	  expansion	  politically,	  economically,	  and	  
diplomatically	  into	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  	  
European	  writings	  about	  the	  Baghdad	  Railroad	  generally	  depict	  the	  rail	  as	  a	  
way	  for	  Europe	  to	  try	  to	  save	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  the	  “sick	  man	  of	  Europe”	  whose	  
ambition	  had	  led	  to	  the	  decline.	  European	  analyses	  of	  the	  Railway	  generally	  point	  to	  
the	  rail	  as	  a	  political	  venture	  by	  the	  Germans	  and	  even	  as	  a	  flashpoint	  of	  WWI.	  
However,	  an	  examination	  of	  how	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  II	  worked	  out	  the	  plan	  for	  the	  
railroad	  and	  of	  his	  view	  of	  its	  development	  provides	  a	  different	  perspective	  from	  the	  
majority	  of	  the	  literature.	  In	  Morris	  Jastrow’s	  account	  of	  the	  Railway,	  considered	  one	  
of	  the	  best	  accounts	  of	  the	  rail	  at	  the	  time	  when	  published	  in	  November	  1917,	  he	  
argues	  that	  the	  story	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  illustrates	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  Eastern	  
Question	  and	  points	  to	  diplomatic	  intrigue	  and	  mutual	  distrust	  between	  the	  East	  and	  
West.18	  Writing	  shortly	  after	  the	  end	  of	  WWI,	  he	  contended	  that:	  
After	  the	  world	  has	  been	  made	  safe	  for	  democracy,	  it	  will	  be	  the	  chief	  task	  of	  
the	  coming	  Fourth	  Conference	  to	  keep	  it	  safe,	  by	  giving	  the	  first	  
                                                  
17 E.H.	  Cookridge,	  Orient	  Express;	  Life	  and	  Times	  of	  the	  World’s	  Most	  Famous	  Train,	  3. 
18 Jastrow,	  Morris.	  1917.	  The	  war	  and	  the	  Bagdad	  Railway;	  the	  story	  of	  Asia	  Minor	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  
the	  present	  conflict.	  Philadelphia:	  J.B.	  Lippincott	  Co.,	  151.	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consideration	  to	  the	  claims	  of	  every	  people	  to	  life,	  liberty	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
happiness.19	  	  
	  
The	  Great	  War	  to	  make	  the	  world	  a	  safer	  place	  for	  democracy	  was	  intended	  to	  
present	  a	  new	  era	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  and	  cooperation.	  Based	  on	  the	  
principles	  presented	  by	  Sir	  Edward	  Grey	  in	  October	  1916,	  Jastrow	  explained:	  
The	  supremacy	  of	  right	  over	  force…	  and	  the	  free	  development	  under	  
conditions	  of	  equality	  and	  conformity	  to	  their	  own	  genius,	  of	  all	  the	  states,	  
large	  and	  small,	  who	  constitute	  civilized	  humanity,	  	  
	  
Jastrow	  assumed	  that	  if	  this	  spirit	  prevailed,	  the	  Eastern	  Question	  would	  rightly	  be	  
solved.20	  	  	  
Literature	  about	  the	  railway	  written	  shortly	  after	  or	  before	  the	  Great	  War	  
point	  to	  the	  rail	  as	  a	  tangible	  effect	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Eastern	  Question.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  
its	  construction	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  the	  rail	  was	  largely	  about	  colonialism	  and	  
about	  Germany’s	  efforts	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  rail.	  The	  rail	  represented	  a	  struggle	  
for	  supremacy	  among	  European	  powers.	  However,	  a	  look	  at	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Sultan	  
Abdulhamid	  II	  carefully	  used	  the	  rivalry	  among	  European	  powers	  to	  his	  own	  
advantage	  presents	  a	  different	  side	  to	  the	  story.	  At	  the	  time	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  II	  
took	  the	  throne	  in	  1876,	  there	  were	  little	  over	  100	  miles	  of	  railway	  tracks	  in	  the	  
massive	  Ottoman	  Empire.21	  	  
                                                  
19	  Jastrow,	  152.	  
20	  Jastrow,	  152. 
21 Munayyir,	   Muḥammad	   ʻĀrif	   ibn	   Aḥmad,	   and	   Jacob	   M.	   Landau.	   1971.	   The	  Hejaz	   Railway	   and	   the	  
Muslim	  pilgrimage;	  a	  case	  of	  Ottoman	  political	  propaganda.	  Detroit:	  Wayne	  State	  University	  Press.,	  10 
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The	  geography	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  extending	  from	  parts	  of	  Europe,	  Asia,	  
and	  Africa,	  as	  well	  as	  three	  thousand	  miles	  of	  coast	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Crimean	  War,	  
made	  it	  an	  important	  and	  strategic	  source	  for	  trade	  and	  commercial	  relations.	  
However,	  the	  large	  empire	  struggled	  to	  control	  such	  a	  vast	  territory	  from	  the	  center.	  
When	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  II	  came	  to	  the	  throne	  he	  was	  “hostile	  to	  liberal	  or	  
constitutional	  ideas,”	  but	  also	  
by	  no	  means	  entirely	  opposed	  to	  reform	  and	  Westernization	  in	  which,	  
judiciously	  selected	  and	  applied,	  he	  saw	  the	  means	  of	  reinforcing	  both	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  his	  own	  position	  in	  it.22	  	  
	  
Sources	  on	  Adulhamid	  II	  are	  generally	  conflicted	  when	  discussing	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  
sultan.	  	  
After	  being	  granted	  the	  permission	  to	  finance	  and	  construct	  the	  railway,	  the	  
German	  syndicate’s	  efforts	  to	  construct	  the	  “Baghdad	  bahn”	  were	  not	  without	  
challenges.	  Many	  financial,	  political,	  and	  geographic	  challenges	  stood	  in	  the	  way	  of	  
its	  construction,	  which	  began	  shortly	  after	  the	  concession	  was	  granted	  in	  1903.	  The	  
first	  section	  of	  the	  railway	  extended	  approximately	  200	  kilometers	  from	  Konia	  to	  
Bulgurlu	  and	  was	  built	  without	  difficulty	  on	  a	  very	  flat	  terrain.23	  A	  second	  section	  of	  
the	  railway	  was	  not	  built	  until	  1910	  due	  to	  the	  challenging	  terrain.24	  While	  a	  large	  
part	  of	  the	  railway	  was	  built	  before	  World	  War	  I,	  the	  rail	  was	  not	  completed	  by	  the	  
outbreak	  of	  war.	  	  
                                                  
22 KarKar,	  20. 
23 KarKar,	  73. 
24 KarKar,	  73.	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The	  development	  of	  German	  involvement	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  was	  
strikingly	  larger.	  From	  1880	  to	  1914,	  German	  investment	  grew	  from	  zero	  to	  over	  
600	  million	  marks,	  most	  of	  which	  was	  invested	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway.25	  This	  large	  
investment	  drew	  great	  attention	  from	  rival	  powers,	  who	  were	  concerned	  to	  see	  how	  
railroads	  were	  changing	  balances	  of	  power	  and	  world	  economies.	  	  
The	  large	  bureaucracy	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  created	  challenges	  for	  
foreign	  investors,	  who	  were	  all	  struggling	  to	  gain	  favor	  and	  concessions	  from	  the	  
Ottoman	  officials	  to	  build	  rails.	  High	  turnover	  rate	  of	  Ottoman	  officials	  made	  it	  
difficult	  to	  develop	  the	  necessary	  business	  relationships	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  
negotiations.	  Successful	  negotiations,	  particularly	  for	  smaller	  foreign	  companies,	  
often	  took	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  economic	  value	  for	  foreign	  investors,	  the	  German	  case	  
provides	  an	  interesting	  example.	  The	  German	  government	  aggressively	  pursued	  its	  
railway	  interests	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  expended	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  and	  
resources	  in	  the	  project.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  point	  out	  that	  “trade	  figures	  between	  
1900	  and	  1912	  showed	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  exports	  and	  imports,”	  “Fir	  1900-­‐1901:	  
Exports:	  $583,000;	  1912;	  4,636,000.”26	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  these	  figures	  illustrate	  a	  
rising	  number	  of	  imports	  between	  Germany	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  the	  
development	  of	  these	  railroads	  also	  increased	  the	  imports	  and	  exports	  to	  those	  
countries,	  which	  were	  not	  involved	  in	  building	  the	  railroad.	  For	  example,	  “a	  look	  a	  
                                                  
25 KarKar,	  74. 
26 KarKar,	  90. 
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trade	  relations	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  between	  1850	  
and	  1914	  shows	  a	  steady	  improvement,”	  and	  that	  “total	  trade	  has	  risen	  from	  
$596,000	  in	  1850	  to	  $17,514,558	  in	  1914.”27	  
The	  risks	  involved	  with	  building	  the	  railroad	  were	  difficult	  to	  assess	  because	  
there	  were	  so	  many	  factors	  involved.	  In	  addition,	  because	  the	  railroad	  business	  was	  
so	  new,	  it	  was	  hard	  for	  outside	  businesses	  and	  countries	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  
and,	  if	  so,	  how	  to	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  project.	  Before	  moving	  
on	  and	  discussing	  the	  uncertainty	  further,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  review	  the	  context	  and	  
relations	  of	  the	  key	  nations	  of	  Germany	  and	  Britain	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  	  
	   From	  the	  1890s	  on,	  Germany’s	  efforts	  to	  extent	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  affected	  its	  relationship	  with	  Britain.	  The	  Railway	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  bold	  and	  ambitious	  ventures	  of	  Germany	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  
	  
Germany	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
	   The	  relationship	  between	  Germany	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  became	  a	  
central	  point	  of	  focus	  for	  the	  world	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  World	  War	  I.	  As	  the	  economy	  of	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  declined,	  surrounding	  European	  nations	  looked	  to	  become	  
increasingly	  involved	  in	  Ottoman	  affairs	  and	  thus	  dove	  into	  “mutual	  competition	  for	  
political	  and	  economic	  influence”	  in	  the	  region.28	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  this	  
                                                  
27 KarKAr,	  91. 
28 Trumpener,	  Ulrich.	  1968.	  Germany	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire,	  1914-­‐1918.	  Princeton,	  	  	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press.,	  3.	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situation,	  “contributed	  substantially	  to	  the	  general	  atmosphere	  of	  distrust	  which	  
made	  the	  First	  World	  War	  possible.”29	  	  
Imperial	  Germany	  remained	  cautious	  in	  its	  attitude	  toward	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire,	  but	  during	  the	  1880s,	  “particularly	  after	  Bismarck’s	  dismissal,	  Berlin	  
gradually	  abandoned	  its	  policy	  of	  restraint.”30	  German	  banks,	  businessmen,	  
industrial	  firms,	  and	  railway	  companies	  all	  looked	  to	  secure	  interest	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire.31	  In	  the	  political	  realm,	  nationalist	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  Pan-­‐German	  League,	  
began	  to	  voice	  positive	  support	  for	  involvement	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.32	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  investing	  in	  the	  railways	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  in	  the	  decades	  
leading	  up	  to	  WWI,	  Germany’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  was	  
“characterized	  by	  heavy	  investment	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  municipal	  transportation,	  
electric	  utilities,	  agriculture”	  mining,	  and	  drastically	  increased	  trade.33	  A	  key	  point	  
to	  remember	  is	  that	  the	  German-­‐Ottoman	  alliance	  of	  1914	  was	  not	  a	  carefully	  drawn	  
out	  plan,	  as	  these	  investments	  might	  suggest,	  but	  was	  rather,	  a	  “hastily	  made	  
arrangement.”34	  During	  the	  War,	  the	  Baghdad	  railway	  played	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  
providing	  a	  “halfway	  viable	  transportation	  link	  between	  Constantinople	  and	  the	  
various	  Eastern	  theaters	  of	  war.”35	  
                                                  
29 Trumpener,	  6.	  
30 Trumpener,	  4. 
31 Trumpener,4. 
32 Trumpener,	  5.	  
33 Trumpener,	  8-­‐9. 
34 Trumpener,	  16.	  
35 Trumpener,	  288.	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The	  Ottoman	  government	  implemented	  a	  policy	  designed	  to	  balance	  the	  
involvement	  of	  all	  great	  powers	  in	  its	  realm.	  The	  British	  and	  French	  also	  had	  large	  
investments	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  The	  French,	  for	  example,	  held	  fifty-­‐nine	  percent	  
of	  the	  “Ottoman	  Public	  Debt,	  which	  was	  administered	  by	  an	  international	  agency	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  Porte’s	  creditors	  by	  1914.”	  36	  Germany	  and	  Britain	  divided	  up	  what	  
remained,	  making	  it	  about	  twenty	  percent	  each.	  Germany’s	  total	  capital	  investments	  
in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  paled	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  French	  that	  by	  1914	  nearly	  
exceeded	  900	  million	  gold	  francs,	  while	  the	  total	  German	  investment	  was	  between	  
500	  and	  600	  million	  gold	  francs.37	  	  
The	  British	  and	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
“Geo-­‐politics	  were	  a	  significant	  aspect	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire’s	  relevance	  to	  the	  
British.”38	  The	  prominent	  positioning	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  in	  control	  of	  the	  
Dardanelles	  and	  the	  Bosphorous,	  the	  two	  narrow	  straits	  “on	  which	  communications	  
between	  the	  Mediterranean	  and	  the	  Black	  Sea	  were	  dependent,”	  made	  it	  impossible	  
for	  the	  British	  to	  ignore	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  As	  other	  powerful	  nations	  invested	  in	  
the	  empire,	  the	  British	  felt	  inclined	  to	  do	  so	  as	  well.	  	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  and	  other	  Ottoman	  sultans	  tried	  to	  maintain	  diplomatic	  
neutrality,	  and	  tried	  to	  use	  this	  international	  competition	  to	  their	  advantage.	  For	  the	  
British,	  however,	  this	  was	  a	  necessary	  evil	  that	  had	  to	  be	  dealt	  with.	  	  Britain	  and	  the	  
                                                  
36 Trumpener,	  11. 
37 Trumpener,	  10.	  
38 Burman,	  John.	  2010.	  Britain's	  relations	  with	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  during	  the	  embassy	  of	  Sir	  Nicholas	  
O'Connor	  to	  the	  Porte,	  1898-­‐1908.	  Istanbul:	  The	  Isis	  Press,	  14.	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Ottoman	  Empire	  had	  officially	  formalized	  diplomatic	  ties	  in	  1583,	  so	  during	  the	  
twentieth	  century,	  in	  many	  respects	  the	  formal	  diplomatic	  activity	  between	  London	  




	   	  
Map	  Showing	  the	  Proposed	  Route	  of	  the	  Berlin	  to	  Baghdad	  Railway	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  From	  the	  Geography	  of	  the	  Great	  War	  by	  Frank	  M.	  McMurry.	  Note:	  The	  Completed	  Line	  
is	  represented	  by	  a	  solid	  black	  line.	  Uncompleted	  Line	  by	  dashed	  lines.40	  
                                                  
39 Burman	  41-­‐2.	  






In	  1836	  the	  British	  Colonel	  Chesney	  first	  suggested	  building	  a	  railway	  along	  this	  
route,	  and	  he	  persisted	  in	  trying	  to	  raise	  investor	  interest	  in	  the	  project	  up	  until	  the	  
Crimean	  War	  (1854-­‐55).41	  However,	  nothing	  was	  accomplished	  until	  1871,	  when	  the	  
Ottoman	  government	  completed	  the	  first	  29	  miles	  from	  Constantinople	  to	  Izmir.	  	  
The	  same	  year,	  German	  official	  and	  railway	  engineer,	  Wilhelm	  von	  Pressel	  
arrived	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  became	  “enthralled	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  building	  a	  modern	  
railway	  through	  Anatolia	  and	  Mesopotamia”	  and	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  research	  
and	  planning.42	  He	  realized	  that	  the	  project	  was	  large	  and	  complicated.	  	  To	  construct	  
a	  railway	  that	  “linked	  Istanbul,	  Ankara,	  and	  Baghdad	  to	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  port	  of	  
Basra”	  would	  require	  outside	  financing	  and	  support.43	  But	  at	  that	  time	  investing	  in	  
the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  was	  seen	  as	  too	  risky	  for	  most	  investors.	  	  
This	  was	  also	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  British	  although	  an	  1872	  commission	  did	  
recommend	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  for	  its	  significant	  strategic	  importance	  as	  a	  second	  
line	  of	  communication	  (in	  addition	  to	  the	  Suez	  Canal).44	  The	  perils	  of	  making	  a	  major	  
investment	  in	  this	  area	  were	  underlined	  by	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire’s	  declaration	  of	  
bankruptcy	  in	  1876	  just	  before	  Abdulhamid	  II	  became	  Sultan.45	  
                                                  
41	  http://www.engrailhistory.info/r100.html 
42 McMurray,	  18. 
43 McMurray,	  18.	  
44 http://www.engrailhistory.info/r100.html 
45 McMurray,	  16.	  
 
 16	  
The	  bold	  vision	  of	  a	  railway	  to	  Baghdad	  continued	  to	  be	  discussed	  by	  many	  
countries,	  including	  France,	  Russia	  and	  Britain.	  The	  Ottoman	  government	  also	  
considered	  various	  internal	  proposals.	  
In	  a	  report	  submitted	  to	  the	  Sultan	  in	  1880	  by	  the	  Minister	  of	  Public	  Works,	  
the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  took	  first	  place	  among	  the	  various	  public	  undertakings	  
under	  consideration.	  The	  project	  had	  no	  better	  fate	  than	  the	  others,	  including	  
those,	  which	  had	  agitated	  public	  opinion	  between	  1878	  and	  1886.	  Among	  
them	  was	  that	  promoted	  by	  a	  syndicate	  under	  the	  chairmanship	  of	  the	  Duke	  
of	  Sutherland,	  who	  sent	  an	  expedition	  headed	  by	  the	  great	  explorer	  Cameron	  
to	  map	  out	  the	  line.46	  
The	  British	  were	  mostly	  focused	  upon	  the	  Suez	  Canal,	  and	  other	  countries	  
were	  not	  interested	  in	  or	  able	  to	  undertake	  such	  a	  large-­‐scale	  project.	  
With	  the	  widening	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  in	  1886,	  Great	  Britain	  was	  confirmed	  in	  
her	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  field.	  Although	  France	  had	  great	  political	  and	  
commercial	  interests	  in	  Turkey,	  she	  confined	  her	  railway	  activities	  to	  lines	  of	  
a	  more	  local	  character.	  47	  
However,	  the	  project	  was	  certainly	  back	  for	  discussion	  in	  1888,	  when	  the	  Sultan	  
granted	  a	  concession	  to	  Germany	  to	  construct	  the	  next	  step	  of	  the	  Railway	  from	  
Izmir	  to	  Ankara.48	  	  
Kaiser	  Wilhelm’s	  1898	  visit	  to	  Constantinople	  
Negotiations	  for	  the	  railway	  began	  in	  earnest	  ten	  years	  later	  in	  1898	  after	  
Kaiser	  Wilhelm	  visited	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  in	  Constantinople.	  It	  must	  be	  explained	  
                                                  






that	  German	  political	  officials	  were	  not	  inclined	  to	  sponsor	  any	  of	  the	  railroad	  
because	  of	  the	  risk.	  Otto	  von	  Bismarck	  seriously	  questioned	  the	  value	  of	  risking	  an	  
investment	  in	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  left	  the	  investment	  and	  gamble	  to	  private	  
German	  businessmen	  and	  financiers.49	  Bismarck’s	  policies	  of	  shying	  away	  from	  
foreign	  investment	  sharply	  contrasted	  with	  those	  of	  Wilhelm	  II	  who	  travelled	  to	  
Istanbul	  in	  1898	  and	  met	  personally	  with	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid.	  	  
Bismarck	  tried	  to	  persuade	  the	  Emperor	  to	  abandon	  his	  visit	  to	  
Constantinople	  and	  wrote	  in	  a	  memorandum	  found	  in	  the	  files	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Office:	  
	  …	  as	  to	  the	  approaching	  journey	  of	  the	  Kaiser	  to	  the	  Orient,	  I	  said	  that	  the	  
reason	  for	  the	  visit	  to	  Constantinople	  lay	  only	  in	  the	  wish	  of	  our	  Majesties	  not	  
to	  come	  home	  from	  Athens	  without	  having	  seen	  Constantinople;	  Germany	  
had	  no	  political	  interests	  in	  the	  Black	  Sea	  and	  the	  Mediterranean;	  and	  it	  was	  
accordingly	  impossible	  that	  the	  visit	  of	  our	  Majesties	  should	  take	  on	  a	  
political	  complexion.50	  	  
	  
Wilhelm’s	  desire	  for	  more	  expansionist	  policies	  led	  to	  “rifts	  that	  developed	  between	  
Bismarck	  and	  Wilhelm,	  which	  eventually	  led	  to	  Bismarck’s	  resignation	  in	  1890.”51	  	  
While	  not	  approved	  by	  Bismarck,	  some	  Germans	  surely	  looked	  favorably	  upon	  a	  
budding	  relationship	  with	  a	  land	  rich	  in	  oil,	  metal,	  and	  resources	  capable	  of	  helping	  
Germany	  become	  less	  reliant	  on	  other	  foreign	  markets.	  	  
Despite	  a	  successful	  meeting	  between	  the	  Sultan	  and	  Wilhelm,	  the	  concession	  
for	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  to	  the	  German	  syndicate	  did	  not	  follow	  immediately.	  The	  
                                                  
49 McMurray,	  Jonathan	  S.	  2001.	  Distant	  ties	  Germany,	  the	  Ottoman	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  construction	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  Westport,	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  Praeger.	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50 Earle,	  Edward	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  the	  Great	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  and	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  A	  Study	  in	  Imperialism.	  New	  
York:	  Macmillan,	  1923.,	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51 McMurray,	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construction	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  was	  not	  officially	  approved	  by	  Sultan	  
Abdulhamid	  II	  until	  1903.	  At	  that	  time	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  gave	  a	  concession	  
to	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank	  to	  build	  a	  railway	  that	  would	  extend	  to	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.52	  This	  
concession	  granted	  the	  German	  Syndicate	  a	  time	  frame	  of	  99	  years,	  and	  included	  the	  
incorporation	  of	  the	  sections	  of	  the	  rail,	  which	  were	  already	  built,	  “Haidar-­‐Pasha	  
and	  Eskishehr-­‐Konia.”53	  	  
Beginning	  of	  construction	  
The	  first	  200-­‐kilometer	  section	  of	  the	  railway	  opened	  in	  October	  25,	  1904	  in	  
commemoration	  of	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid’s	  birthday.	  This	  section	  was	  built	  with	  few	  
problems	  and	  the	  opening	  was	  met	  with	  great	  celebration.	  However,	  the	  terrain	  in	  
this	  section,	  which	  went	  from	  Konya-­‐Bulgurlu,	  was	  not	  nearly	  as	  challenging	  as	  the	  
more	  mountainous	  and	  desolate	  regions.54	  The	  rail	  for	  this	  section	  required	  a	  lot	  of	  
resources	  to	  be	  transported	  over	  difficult	  terrain	  with	  little	  infrastructure	  in	  place	  in	  
order	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
Newspaper	  articles	  and	  travel	  diaries	  provide	  fascinating	  insights	  into	  the	  
construction	  efforts	  for	  the	  Baghdad	  railway.	  The	  building	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  much	  
international	  scrutiny	  and	  many	  curious	  travelers	  and	  journalists	  came	  to	  observe	  
the	  building	  and	  progress	  of	  the	  rail.	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End	  of	  construction	  
Between	  1908	  and	  1914,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Ottoman	  government	  
and	  the	  Germans	  changed	  dramatically.	  The	  arrival	  of	  the	  young	  Turks	  forced	  
Germany	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy,	  which	  went	  beyond	  the	  personal	  relationship	  
between	  Wilhelm	  and	  Abdulhamid.	  	  Some	  viewed	  the	  German	  rail	  project	  as	  a	  
colonial	  threat.55	  “Young	  Turks,”	  is	  a	  term	  “coined	  by	  Europeans	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  
constitutionalist	  opposition	  to	  Abdulhamid.”56	  In	  this	  period,	  groups	  of	  Arabs,	  
Albanians,	  Jews,	  Armenians	  and	  Greeks	  criticized	  the	  Ottoman	  elite	  for	  “adopting	  
only	  superficial	  aspects	  of	  Western	  culture”	  and	  demanded	  that	  reforms	  be	  
consistent	  with	  Islamic	  law.57	  Unrest	  and	  instability	  made	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  
the	  rail	  to	  be	  built,	  particularly	  because	  the	  Germans	  relied	  on	  multiethnic	  workers	  
to	  build	  the	  rail,	  and	  “by	  1914,	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  appeared	  to	  have	  lost	  its	  utility	  
for	  German	  strategic	  aims.”58	  After	  the	  war	  Germany	  lost	  all	  rights	  to	  the	  Baghdad	  
Railway.59	  	  
	  
Part	  2:	  Perspectives	  
Dr.	  George	  von	  Siemens	  (1839	  –1901)	  was	  the	  Managing	  Director	  of	  the	  
Deutsche	  Bank	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  syndicate	  was	  awarded	  the	  concession	  to	  build	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the	  railway.	  Without	  Siemens’	  enthusiasm	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  project	  would	  not	  have	  
taken	  off	  for	  Germany	  the	  way	  that	  it	  did.	  Siemens	  was	  “a	  well-­‐known	  insider	  in	  
German	  financial	  circles.”	  He	  “knew	  his	  ability	  to	  conjure	  up	  funds	  for	  a	  distant	  
railway	  would	  be	  limited	  by	  public	  opinion”	  and	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  Germany	  to	  
have	  a	  strong	  financial	  base	  moving	  forward	  with	  this	  project.60	  Siemens	  worked	  
faithfully	  “to	  keep	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  in	  German	  hands”	  for	  the	  German	  Foreign	  
Office,	  but	  resigned	  his	  position	  in	  December	  1900	  due	  to	  poor	  health.	  The	  new	  
director	  of	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  Arthur	  von	  Gwinner,	  continued	  to	  implement	  his	  plan	  
and	  ultimately	  became	  more	  successful	  than	  Siemens.61	  	  
The	  initial	  idea	  for	  the	  Railway	  was	  presented	  to	  Dr.	  Siemens	  by	  Wilhelm	  von	  
Pressel	  (1821–1902),	  and	  it	  was	  originally	  called,	  “the	  Pressel	  Project.”	  Until	  Dr.	  
Siemens	  approved	  the	  idea,	  the	  main	  challenge	  of	  building	  the	  railway	  was	  capital	  
and	  determining	  the	  route.	  	  
Pressel	  worked	  directly	  with	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  and	  presented	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  
railroad,	  arguing	  that	  it	  would	  be	  beneficial	  for	  the	  empire	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  1876,	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  approved	  Pressel’s	  proposed	  plan	  for	  the	  railroad	  and	  granted	  
him	  an	  envoy	  of	  Turkish	  officials	  so	  that	  he	  might	  travel	  and	  do	  research	  on	  the	  
area.62	  The	  challenge	  for	  Pressel	  moving	  forward,	  however,	  was	  finding	  investors	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and	  financing	  for	  his	  project,	  and	  this	  was	  more	  challenging	  than	  he	  originally	  
imagined.	  “	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  sent	  Pressel	  to	  Germany	  to	  muster	  support	  among	  
bankers	  there,	  yet	  in	  spite	  of	  his	  best	  efforts,	  prospective	  investors	  considered	  his	  
proposal	  too	  risky.”63	  When	  Pressel	  finally	  got	  support	  for	  his	  project	  from	  Dr.	  
Siemens	  and	  investors	  at	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  they	  took	  his	  project	  and	  made	  it	  their	  
own.	  	  
On	  November	  27,	  1899,	  Siemens	  then	  director	  of	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank	  and	  
president	  of	  the	  Anatolian	  Railway	  Company,	  announced	  the	  initial	  plans	  for	  the	  
railway	  and	  that	  the	  concession	  had	  been	  granted	  to	  the	  German	  syndicate.64	  
Siemens	  quipped,	  “The	  so-­‐called	  Baghdad	  Railway	  concession	  is	  only	  a	  piece	  of	  
paper…for	  which	  I	  paid	  200,000	  Turkish	  lira!”65	  	  
Pressel	  had	  wanted	  to	  build	  the	  railroad	  for	  the	  betterment	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire,	  but	  he	  was	  forced	  to	  watch	  from	  the	  sidelines	  as	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank	  
attempted	  to	  make	  this	  project	  a	  purely	  German	  enterprise.66	  Pressel	  felt	  betrayed	  
and	  wrote	  in	  1902,	  
	  I	  have	  decided	  to	  fight	  for	  my	  project	  against	  the	  superior	  strength	  of	  my	  
opponents	  as	  long	  as	  God	  gives	  me	  strength,	  until	  my	  last	  breath,	  like	  a	  
lioness	  for	  her	  cubs.	  Because	  I	  have	  the	  right	  to	  call	  the	  Anatolian	  Railway	  my	  
child.67	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He	  died	  shortly	  after	  becoming	  disappointed	  that	  his	  “humanitarian”	  efforts	  to	  help	  
the	  Ottomans	  were	  scorned	  by	  German	  businessmen	  and	  politicians.	  	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  was	  careful	  and	  calculating	  and	  was	  not	  keen	  to	  accept	  
any	  bid	  from	  a	  country	  which	  might	  be	  construed	  as	  “foreign	  encroachment	  on	  
Ottoman	  domestic	  affairs…	  and	  in	  light	  of	  this,	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Office	  continued	  
to	  claim	  that	  the	  railway	  was	  a	  purely	  commercial	  enterprise,	  run	  by	  an	  unaffiliated	  
international	  company	  under	  German	  leadership”	  and	  was	  in	  no	  way	  a	  tool	  of	  
German	  expansionism.68	  The	  Deutsche	  Bank	  group	  argued	  that	  the	  true	  strength	  of	  
the	  railway	  was	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  strengthen	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  that	  Germany	  
and	  the	  Ottomans	  could	  maintain	  a	  powerful	  partnership.	  	  
The	  process	  required	  a	  lot	  of	  patience	  from	  the	  Germans,	  and	  Siemens	  grew	  
impatient	  waiting	  for	  approval	  for	  the	  project	  and	  considered	  forgetting	  the	  whole	  
endeavor.	  “I	  don’t	  give	  a	  damn	  about	  the	  concession	  or	  the	  whole	  Baghdad	  Railway,”	  
he	  exclaimed.69	  The	  cause	  for	  the	  delays	  was	  that	  other	  proposals	  were	  being	  sent	  to	  
the	  Sultan	  from	  both	  British	  and	  French	  investors.	  	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  II	  (1842-­‐1918)	  was	  Ottoman	  sultan	  from	  1876	  to	  1909.	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  government	  on	  the	  Ottoman	  side,	  a	  little	  
background	  must	  be	  given	  on	  the	  reign	  of	  the	  Sultan	  known	  both	  as	  the	  last	  great	  
                                                  




sultan	  and	  vilified	  as	  the	  “red	  sultan.”70	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  II	  ruled	  from	  1876-­‐1909	  
and	  presided	  over	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  during	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  change	  and	  crisis.	  	  
The	  Ottoman	  Empire	  went	  bankrupt	  the	  year	  before	  Abdulhamid	  took	  the	  
throne	  in	  1875,	  and	  due	  to	  a	  coup	  d’état,	  Abdulhamid	  II	  became	  the	  third	  Sultan	  to	  
rule	  in	  the	  year	  1876.	  This	  led	  to	  his	  intense	  paranoia	  and	  distrust	  of	  other	  Ottoman	  
officials.	  Despite	  this	  deep	  mistrust	  of	  those	  around	  him,	  Abdulhamid	  II	  took	  great	  
effort	  to	  restructure	  and	  reform	  the	  Ottoman	  government.	  One	  of	  his	  strategies,	  in	  
addition	  to	  governmental	  reform,	  was	  his	  pan-­‐Islamic	  policy.	  This	  pan-­‐Islamic	  
strategy,	  while	  intending	  to	  bring	  Muslims	  together	  and	  help	  strengthen	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  as	  a	  whole,	  also	  served	  as	  a	  form	  of	  Ottoman	  propaganda.71	  Sultan	  
Abdulhamid’s	  pan	  Islamism	  was	  a	  political	  tool	  and	  campaign	  to	  strengthen	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  by	  gaining	  support	  from	  Muslims	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  most	  
tangible	  result	  of	  these	  efforts	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  propaganda	  for	  the	  Hejaz	  Railway	  
during	  the	  1900s,	  where	  the	  project	  to	  connect	  the	  holy	  cities	  of	  Mecca	  and	  Medina	  
by	  rail	  gained	  enormous	  sympathy	  and	  support	  from	  Muslims	  and	  Arabs	  all	  over	  the	  
world.72	  	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  needed	  an	  ally	  who	  would	  be	  able	  to	  help	  provide	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  with	  financial	  support	  as	  well	  as	  provide	  support	  in	  training	  its	  
                                                  
70 Benjamin	  Fortna,	  “The	  Reign	  of	  Abdulhamid	  II,”	  Fleet,	  Kate,	  Suraiya	  Faroqhi,	  and	  Reşat	  Kasaba.	  The	  
Cambridge	  History	  of	  Turkey.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  p.	  38.	  
71 Fortna,	  47-­‐49. 
72 Munayyir,	  Muḥammad	  ʻĀrif	  ibn	  Aḥmad,	  and	  Jacob	  M.	  Landau,	  19-­‐20. 
 
 24	  
military.73	  Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  also	  desired	  to	  find	  an	  ally	  outside	  of	  his	  own	  realm	  
he	  could	  both	  trust	  and	  consult	  with,	  particularly	  after	  he	  rose	  to	  power	  when	  his	  
brother	  Murat	  V	  was	  “forcibly	  deposed”	  74	  	  
Sultan	  Abdulhamid	  insisted	  that	  the	  power	  not	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  his	  Pan-­‐
Islamic	  movement.	  His	  goal	  was	  to	  unify	  various	  Islamic	  communities,	  and	  he	  
wanted	  the	  development	  of	  this	  railroad	  to	  connect	  Muslims	  all	  over	  the	  world.75	  
The	  sultan	  hoped	  that	  this	  Pan-­‐Islamism	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  
and	  serve	  to	  bolster	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire.	  	  
Here	  are	  some	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  agreement	  he	  made	  with	  the	  Germans.	  Dr.	  
Siemens	  was	  certainly	  pleased	  with	  the	  first	  part	  of	  these	  terms:	  
All	  material	  imported	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  road	  was	  to	  be	  free	  from	  
duty…and	  [the	  Germany	  syndicate	  had]	  the	  privilege	  of	  reserving	  to	  itself	  the	  
right	  to	  construct	  and	  exploit	  ports	  of	  Baghdad,	  Basra,	  and	  only	  the	  Persian	  
Gulf,”	  as	  well	  as	  access	  to	  all	  ports	  on	  the	  Euphrates,	  Tigris,	  and	  the	  Shatt-­‐el-­‐
Arab.76	  	  	  
	  
In	  return	  for	  these	  concessions,	  the	  Ottomans	  demanded	  that	  workmen	  were	  to	  be	  
Ottoman	  subjects,	  and	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  high	  German	  officials,	  “everybody	  
connected	  with	  the	  railway	  was	  to	  wear	  a	  fez.”77	  	  
The	  geography	  of	  the	  railway	  was	  rich	  with	  resources	  including	  minerals,	  
fuel,	  and	  oil,	  and	  other	  raw	  materials,	  all	  of	  which	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  great	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powers	  of	  the	  world.78	  Before	  setting	  out	  to	  build	  the	  rail,	  Dr.	  Siemens	  sent	  out	  an	  
expedition	  to	  trace	  the	  proposed	  route	  of	  the	  railway	  from	  terminus	  to	  terminus	  in	  
1899.	  The	  group	  assembled	  a	  caravan	  and	  travelled	  for	  six	  months	  through	  each	  
future	  terminus	  of	  the	  rail:	  “Konya,	  Eregli,	  Adana,	  Mersin,	  Aleppo,	  Diyarbakir,	  Mosul,	  
Baghdad,	  and	  Basra.”79	  	  
The	  main	  obstacle	  that	  the	  caravan	  found	  was	  with	  the	  lawlessness	  of	  the	  
region.	  Much	  of	  the	  rail,	  which	  went	  through	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire’s	  peripheral	  
provinces,	  was	  not	  controlled	  well	  by	  the	  center.	  This	  issue	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  
attention	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  government,	  and	  Abdulhamid	  used	  it	  to	  his	  advantage	  in	  
order	  to	  reassert	  control	  from	  the	  center.	  	  
It	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  
Germany	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  reliant	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  railway’s	  
construction.	  “On	  November	  23,	  1903,	  the	  Imperial	  Ottoman	  Government	  took	  out	  
its	  first	  loan	  on	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  54	  million	  francs	  with	  4-­‐
percent	  interest	  payable	  in	  98	  years.”80	  The	  Ottoman	  government	  needed	  the	  
railway	  to	  be	  a	  success.	  	  
The	  English	  traveler,	  David	  Fraser,	  who	  traveled	  the	  length	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  
Railway,	  recorded	  his	  journey	  in	  a	  diary	  and	  was	  surprised	  at	  the	  lack	  of	  politics	  
displayed	  by	  Germans	  involved	  in	  the	  railway	  project.	  Fraser	  published	  his	  diaries	  
and	  account	  of	  his	  journey	  along	  the	  Berlin-­‐Baghdad	  railway	  in	  1909.	  In	  his	  work,	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Short	  Cut	  to	  India:	  The	  Record	  of	  a	  Journey	  along	  the	  Route	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway,	  
Fraser	  explained	  that	  his	  goals	  in	  following	  the	  proposed	  railway	  route	  of	  the	  
Baghdad	  railway	  were	  “to	  endeavor	  to	  discover	  what	  Germany	  has	  to	  gain	  by	  
construction	  of	  the	  railway,	  and	  what	  England	  stands	  to	  lose.”81	  Fraser	  finally	  
reached	  Baghdad	  in	  1908	  and	  finished	  his	  book	  just	  at	  the	  time	  when	  the	  Young	  
Turks	  took	  hold	  of	  the	  government.	  
Fraser	  commented	  that	  	  
Man	  and	  railways	  have	  a	  trick	  of	  reacting	  upon	  each	  other,	  to	  their	  mutual	  
benefit…	  if	  certain	  elements	  are	  not	  favorable	  man	  may	  be	  brought	  to	  a	  
railway,	  or	  a	  railway	  brought	  to	  man,	  without	  there	  ensuing	  any	  material	  
gain	  in	  prosperity.82	  	  
	  
Fraser	  also	  found	  the	  multiethnic	  nature	  of	  the	  rail	  to	  be	  interesting	  as	  he	  wrote	  that	  	  
One	  hears	  much	  of	  German	  commercial	  enterprise	  in	  Turkey,	  and	  
particularly	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  Anatolian	  Railway…	  but	  on	  the	  railway	  
itself	  there	  is	  little	  to	  indicated	  Teutonic	  surroundings.	  All	  the	  police	  are	  
Turkish,	  all	  the	  minor	  officials	  Turks,	  Greeks,	  and	  Armenians…throughout	  
the	  whole	  of	  three	  days’	  journey	  I	  saw	  only	  a	  single	  German,	  the	  engineer	  for	  
the	  Baghdad	  section.83	  	  
	  
Fraser	  simply	  assumed	  that	  the	  German	  enterprise	  was	  “cheap”	  and	  caring	  “first	  for	  
their	  own	  pockets	  and	  next	  for	  Germany.”84	  Fraser’s	  account	  provides	  many	  
fascinating	  insights,	  including	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  timetables	  for	  the	  British	  
steamships	  and	  the	  Baghdad	  railway	  to	  transport	  goods.	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   Fraser	  explained	  that	  out	  of	  the	  three	  countries	  primarily	  interested	  in	  the	  
Railway,	  Turkey,	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  Germany,	  the	  British	  are	  quite	  clearly	  getting	  the	  
better	  end	  of	  the	  deal	  by	  not	  being	  involved.	  According	  to	  Fraser,	  “all	  the	  benefits	  
conferred	  by	  railway,	  in	  the	  shape	  of	  construction	  expenditure	  to	  laborers,	  
settlement	  of	  districts	  now	  insecure,	  increase	  of	  cultivation,	  and	  general	  stimulation	  
of	  commerce	  will	  be	  counterbalanced	  by	  the	  capital	  loss.”85	  The	  complete	  line	  of	  rail	  
will	  be	  2400	  kilometers	  (12	  sections),	  each	  costing	  a	  loan	  of	  54,000,000	  francs	  or	  
26,000,000	  notes.	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  when	  considering	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
railroad	  because,	  particularly	  during	  the	  early	  stages,	  the	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  was	  
ambiguous	  for	  the	  British.	  	  
From	  the	  British	  point	  of	  view,	  there	  were	  three	  main	  considerations	  that	  
Fraser	  described	  as	  commercial,	  political,	  and	  strategic.	  Fraser	  proved	  with	  a	  chart	  
of	  timetables	  that	  British	  Gulf	  shipping	  “has	  nothing	  to	  fear	  from	  railway	  
competition,	  and	  that	  our	  trade	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  an	  enterprise	  from	  
which	  economic	  results	  are	  not	  expected.”86	  Fraser	  firmly	  believed	  in	  his	  travel	  
diaries	  that	  “Germany	  has	  much	  to	  gain	  from	  the	  Baghdad	  railway,	  and	  much	  to	  
lose,”	  and	  that	  “we	  have	  no	  other	  wish	  in	  regard	  to	  Turkey	  but	  that	  she	  may	  be	  
strong	  and	  prosperous	  and	  progressive”	  because	  she	  is	  an	  asset	  for	  trade	  and	  British	  
market	  development	  in	  the	  Mediterranean.87	  The	  financial	  risk	  of	  participating	  in	  
the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  project	  for	  the	  British,	  according	  to	  Fraser	  was	  enormous.	  By	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leaving	  the	  “Baghdad	  scheme”	  to	  Germany,	  Fraser	  quite	  happily	  determined	  that	  all	  
of	  the	  risk	  would	  falls	  upon	  on	  Germany.	  88	  	  	  
As	  one	  might	  expect	  Germany’s	  ambassador	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  Porte,	  Adolf	  
Freiherr	  Marschall	  von	  Bieberstein	  (1842-­‐1912)	  had	  a	  different	  perspective.	  He	  was	  
determined	  to	  make	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  as	  “a	  tool	  of	  German	  
Weltpolitik.”	  Marschall	  wrote	  in	  his	  diaries	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  “blaze	  the	  trail	  for	  
Germanness,	  especially	  the	  German	  language,	  in	  the	  regions	  through	  which	  that	  
railway	  will	  pass.”89	  	  
Dr.	  Siemens	  and	  Dr.	  von	  Gwinner,	  the	  two	  brains	  behind	  the	  project,	  
recognized	  the	  challenge	  of	  being	  the	  sole	  financiers	  of	  the	  project	  and	  Dr.	  von	  
Gwinner	  wrote	  an	  article	  in	  1909,	  “The	  Baghdad	  Railway	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  British	  
Cooperation”	  in	  which	  he	  expressed	  the	  need	  to	  be	  open	  to	  international	  
involvement	  and	  partnership	  on	  the	  project.90	  	  	  
Not	  all	  British	  agreed	  with	  the	  assessment	  of	  David	  Fraser.	  Indeed,	  British	  
documents	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  railroad	  explain	  that	  British	  officials	  had	  desired	  
that	  a	  British	  company	  should	  gain	  the	  concession	  to	  build	  the	  railroad	  and	  wanted	  
to	  have	  a	  share	  in	  the	  project	  at	  all	  cost.	  As	  Morrow	  explains,	  	  
The	  political	  aspect	  of	  railway	  plans	  in	  the	  Near	  East	  might	  have	  been	  
permanently	  kept	  in	  the	  background.	  The	  European	  situation	  would	  have	  
assumed	  an	  entirely	  different	  coloring,	  if	  England	  and	  German	  had	  not	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clashed	  in	  the	  East	  over	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway,	  as	  happened	  immediately	  
upon	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  convention	  of	  1902-­‐1903.91	  	  
	  
Sir	  Nicholas	  Roderick	  O'Conor	  (1843-­‐1908)	  British	  Ambassador	  in	  
Constantinople,	  in	  the	  letter	  already	  cited	  above	  to	  the	  Marquess	  of	  Lansdowne	  
written	  in	  June	  25,	  1901	  expresses	  concern	  that	  not	  enough	  of	  the	  share	  of	  the	  
railroad	  was	  going	  to	  be	  given	  to	  British	  Syndicate	  and	  that	  German	  and	  French	  
groups	  were	  also	  positioning	  themselves	  to	  be	  granted	  the	  commission	  for	  the	  
railroad.92	  In	  terms	  of	  British	  policy,	  “for	  a	  decade,	  O’Conor	  and	  his	  staff	  were	  the	  
main	  interface	  between	  the	  British	  policy	  making	  establishment	  in	  all	  its	  guises	  
(including	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  the	  India	  Office,	  the	  government	  of	  India	  and	  the	  
British	  Agency	  in	  Egypt),	  and	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  Abdulhamid’s	  administration	  in	  
its	  twilight	  years.”93	  	  
Later,	  in	  1903	  when	  negotiations	  were	  fierce	  over	  who	  might	  be	  granted	  the	  
commission	  to	  build	  the	  railways,	  Mr.	  A.J.	  Balfour	  stated	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  
on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  railway	  that	  “the	  proposed	  railway	  is	  not…	  to	  be	  a	  German	  
railway.”94	  According	  to	  Morrow,	  	  
It	  was	  felt	  in	  England	  that	  if,	  as	  Napoleon	  is	  said	  to	  have	  remarked,	  Antwerp	  
in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  great	  continental	  power	  was	  a	  pistol	  leveled	  at	  the	  English	  
coast,	  Baghdad	  and	  the	  Persian	  Gulf	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Germany	  (or	  any	  other	  
strong	  power)	  would	  be	  a	  42-­‐centimetre	  gun	  pointed	  at	  India.95	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This	  sharp	  controversy	  only	  evolved	  from	  the	  1903	  grant	  of	  preference	  by	  the	  
Ottoman	  Empire	  to	  a	  German	  syndicate	  over	  a	  British	  syndicate	  to	  build	  the	  
Baghdad	  Railway.	  	  
On	  the	  German	  side	  of	  things,	  the	  German	  public	  was	  supportive	  of	  the	  
project.	  As	  explained	  by	  A.J.	  P.	  Taylor	  in	  his	  work,	  The	  Course	  of	  German	  History,	  
Germany’s	  renewed	  colonial	  ambitions	  in	  the	  late	  1890s	  led	  the	  Reich	  to	  support	  
“the	  project	  for	  a	  German	  railway	  across	  Turkey-­‐in-­‐Asia.	  Taylor	  explains	  that	  this	  
project	  “sprung	  from	  the	  German	  Foreign	  Office”	  where	  the	  “imperial	  bureaucrats”	  
welcomed	  “	  a	  manifestation	  of	  German	  power”	  but	  failed	  to	  provide	  capital	  for	  its	  
construction.	  	  
As	  previously	  explained,	  France	  and	  England	  were	  not	  inclined	  to	  support	  a	  
project	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  German	  glory.96	  	  
According	  to	  Taylor,	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  was	  a	  pan-­‐German	  project	  which	  
helped	  to	  propel	  Germany	  toward	  economic	  growth	  and	  assure	  Germany,	  as	  Kaiser	  
Wilhelm	  II	  declared	  in	  1901,“a	  place	  in	  the	  sun.”97	  	  
Interestingly	  enough,	  Dr.	  Siemens	  insisted	  that	  his	  goals	  with	  the	  railroad	  
were	  not	  political	  and	  he	  offered	  to	  internationalize	  the	  enterprise.98	  Morrow	  
explains	  that	  it	  need	  not	  be	  assumed,	  “that	  the	  German	  syndicate	  was	  in	  league	  with	  
the	  Pan-­‐Germanic	  movement.	  Capitalists—even	  though	  they	  be	  patriotic	  Germans—
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are	  not	  apt	  to	  be	  carried	  away	  by	  political	  visions.”99	  Dr.	  von	  Gwinner	  and	  the	  
German	  government	  were	  not	  always	  in	  agreement.	  	  
The	  conflict	  over	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Railway	  illustrates	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
European	  powers	  concerned	  themselves	  with	  colonial	  interests	  in	  the	  East.	  Growing	  
control	  and	  influence	  in	  the	  East	  by	  any	  one	  power	  was	  seen	  as	  threatening	  and	  
labeled	  as	  dangerous.	  France’s	  stake	  in	  the	  railway	  was	  linked	  to	  its	  development	  of	  
railways	  in	  Syria,	  and	  a	  French	  designed	  the	  railway	  from	  Beirut	  to	  Damascus.100	  
The	  initial	  problem	  Germany	  had	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  railway	  was	  with	  
Russia,	  who	  opposed	  the	  first	  plans	  of	  the	  route	  because	  of	  her	  own	  interests	  in	  the	  
region.101	  Russia	  felt	  that	  the	  rail	  threatened	  its	  territory	  in	  eastern	  Asia	  Minor.102	  
Insight	  into	  the	  British	  discussions	  about	  the	  Railway	  are	  plentiful	  in	  the	  
volumes	  of	  British	  Documents	  leading	  to	  the	  Origins	  of	  War	  compiled	  in	  the	  official	  
British	  Documents	  on	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  War,	  1898-­‐1914.	  Edited	  by	  Harold	  W.V.	  
Temperly,	  the	  collected	  documents	  illustrate	  the	  colorful	  discussions	  the	  British	  
were	  involved	  with	  surrounding	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway.	  	  
Herr	  Gwinner	  of	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank	  was	  trying	  to	  make	  the	  railway	  an	  
international	  endeavor	  at	  all	  costs	  and	  desired	  to	  stay	  in	  communication	  with	  the	  
British.	  The	  British	  documents	  include	  drafts	  of	  letters	  sent	  from	  Gwinner	  to	  the	  
Marquess	  of	  Lansdowne	  in	  which	  Gwinner	  details	  plans	  of	  the	  percent	  of	  shares	  that	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the	  British,	  French,	  and	  German	  groups	  would	  have	  as	  capital	  in	  the	  Baghdad	  
Railway	  Company,	  allotting	  equal	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  shares	  to	  each	  of	  the	  three	  
countries.103	  Gwinner	  wrote,	  	  
I	  beg	  to	  state	  that	  myself	  and	  my	  friends	  will	  use	  their	  best	  endeavours	  to	  
bring	  about	  the	  control	  and	  working	  of	  the	  Anatolian	  Railway	  Company’s	  line	  
from	  Haida	  Pasha	  to	  Konia	  as	  part	  of	  an	  internationally	  controlled	  railway	  
line	  from	  sea	  to	  sea.104	  
	  	  
Gwinner	  continued	  by	  noting	  that	  this	  undertaking	  would	  be	  dependent	  on	  several	  
conditions	  and	  assurances.	  
According	  to	  Gwinner,	  the	  British	  and	  the	  British	  group	  would	  agree	  upon	  
three	  basic	  terms	  and	  conditions	  for	  the	  railway.	  First	  they	  would	  agree	  that	  Turkey	  
be	  allowed	  to	  increase	  her	  customs	  revenue.	  Second,	  that	  the	  railway	  would	  secure	  
as	  large	  a	  share	  as	  possible	  of	  the	  Indian	  mail	  and	  passenger	  service	  as	  soon	  as	  a	  
route	  shall	  be	  established	  that	  is	  shorter	  “via	  the	  Persian	  Gulf”	  than	  “via	  the	  Suez.”105	  
Third,	  that	  the	  British	  would	  agree	  to	  provide	  all	  terminal	  facilities	  required	  at	  
“Koweit”	  per	  the	  Ottoman’s	  request.	  This	  letter	  illustrates	  the	  variety	  of	  matters	  that	  
would	  come	  before	  Parliament.	  	  
These	  conditions,	  such	  as	  discussions	  of	  increases	  of	  the	  Turkish	  Tariff	  for	  
increased	  revenue	  to	  the	  Ottoman	  government,	  were	  all	  discussed	  as	  possibly	  being	  
detrimental	  to	  British	  interests.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  the	  railway	  was	  
intended	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  key	  player	  for	  transportation	  both	  of	  goods	  and	  military	  in	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the	  Eastern	  theater.	  An	  internationalization	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  played	  a	  
significant	  role	  for	  the	  British	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  policy	  and	  the	  economic	  “trend	  
toward	  the	  East.”106	  However,	  not	  being	  involved	  in	  the	  project	  was	  argued	  to	  be	  
even	  more	  detrimental	  to	  British	  interests.	  	  
Even	  a	  policy	  of	  neutrality	  regarding	  the	  rail	  line	  was	  considered.	  In	  a	  
memorandum	  by	  the	  Marquess	  of	  Lansdowne	  entitled	  “The	  Baghdad	  Railway,”	  he	  
mused,	  	  
Why	  need	  we	  declare	  ourselves,	  the	  link	  may	  not	  be	  built,	  or	  may,	  at	  all	  
events,	  not	  finished	  for	  many	  a	  long	  day.	  Do	  not	  let	  us	  announce	  at	  this	  stage	  
that	  we	  will	  on	  certain	  conditions	  agree.107	  	  
	  
However	  Lansdowne	  added	  that	  the	  War	  Office	  and	  Director	  of	  Military	  intelligence	  
expressed	  their	  opinions	  on	  the	  subject	  and	  argued	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  a	  great	  mistake	  
to	  oppose	  the	  project,	  which	  we	  ought,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  to	  encourage	  to	  the	  best	  of	  
our	  power,	  provided	  we	  can	  acquire	  a	  proper	  share	  in	  the	  control	  of	  the	  railway	  and	  
of	  its	  outlet	  on	  the	  Persian	  Gulf.”108	  	  
This	  argument	  represents	  a	  key	  theme	  in	  British	  thoughts	  toward	  the	  project	  
and	  highlights	  the	  uncertainty	  felt	  by	  the	  British	  government	  about	  the	  project.	  The	  
sheer	  cost	  of	  the	  project	  was	  enormous,	  but	  it	  was	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	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investment	  might	  also	  act	  as	  a	  deterrent	  against	  other	  nations	  monopolizing	  the	  
area.	  	  
Of	  far	  greater	  concern	  for	  the	  British,	  was	  the	  question	  about	  what	  the	  
Russians	  thought	  about	  the	  railway.	  The	  British	  wondered	  if	  they	  intended	  to	  build	  
their	  own.	  Lansdowne	  wrote	  in	  a	  confidential	  letter	  to	  Sir	  C.	  Scott	  that	  he	  off	  
handedly	  asked	  the	  Russian	  Ambassador	  if	  he	  had	  noticed	  anything	  interesting	  in	  
the	  news	  about	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  question.	  His	  Excellence,	  the	  Russian	  
Ambassador	  noted	  that	  the	  Russian	  Government	  never	  liked	  the	  scheme	  and	  did	  not	  
approve	  of	  Germany	  having	  “dangerous	  preponderance	  in	  Asia	  Minor.”109	  
	   The	  plan	  for	  the	  German	  Company	  to	  possess	  control	  of	  a	  key	  part	  of	  the	  
railway	  from	  Haidar	  Pasha	  to	  Konia,	  and	  then	  having	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  rail	  was	  not	  
enough	  of	  a	  guarantee	  of	  impartial	  treatment	  for	  the	  British.	  For	  the	  Germans	  would	  
then,	  “hold	  the	  key	  of	  the	  door	  by	  which	  the	  through	  traffic	  must	  pass”	  and	  this	  
represented	  a	  key	  consideration	  and	  drawback	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  British.110	  	  
Upon	  hearing	  that	  the	  concession	  for	  the	  railway	  was	  given	  to	  the	  German	  
syndicate	  alone,	  Dr.	  Gwinner,	  expressed	  his	  regret	  that	  negotiations	  had	  not	  
resulted	  in	  British	  participation	  in	  the	  Railway.	  Dr.	  Gwinner	  cited	  the	  sharp	  clamor	  
against	  British	  involvement	  in	  the	  project	  from	  the	  press.	  Lansdowne	  agreed	  that	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the	  “outcry	  against	  the	  scheme	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  choking	  off	  the	  British	  financiers”	  
for	  the	  project.111	  
	  Conclusion	  
Railways	  which	  often	  serve	  to	  connect	  people	  and	  nations	  and	  act	  as	  
“mediums	  of	  exchange”	  for	  goods,	  capital,	  people,	  ideas	  can	  also	  become	  sources	  of	  
conflict	  and	  destruction.112	  Trade	  routes	  often	  become	  “arenas	  of	  imperial	  friction”	  
and	  enhance	  rivalries.113	  For	  example,	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Benjamin	  Disraeli’s	  
purchase	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  brought	  the	  empire	  to	  the	  verge	  of	  war	  and	  Russia’s	  
Trans-­‐Siberian	  Railway	  ended	  with	  Russia	  at	  war	  with	  Japan.114	  	  
The	  Baghdad	  Railway	  project	  became	  a	  leading	  imperial	  problem	  in	  the	  
twentieth	  century.	  The	  geography	  of	  the	  Railway	  made	  it	  a	  prime	  location	  for	  
colonial	  interests	  in	  the	  weakening	  territories	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  Empire	  and	  as	  a	  short	  
cut	  to	  valuable	  trading	  routes	  and	  diplomatic	  connections	  in	  the	  East.	  However,	  the	  
cost	  and	  difficulties	  of	  constructing	  the	  railway	  led	  to	  uncertainty	  and	  conflict	  within	  
the	  diplomatic	  and	  business	  communities	  of	  all	  of	  the	  countries	  involved.	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   Documents	   on	   the	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   Volume	   II	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   15,	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   the	  
Marquess	  of	  Lansdowne,	  no.224,	  p.195-­‐6.	  
112 Morrow,	  115.	  
113 Earle,	  3.	  
114 Earle,	  3-­‐4.	  
 
 36	  
The	  historical	  debate	  about	  the	  Railway	  includes	  many	  questions.	  	  Was	  the	  
Railway	  the	  single	  largest	  factor	  leading	  up	  to	  World	  War	  I?	  In	  his	  work	  The	  War	  
and	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway,	  Morris	  Jastrow	  Jr.	  argues	  that:	  
…the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  will	  be	  found	  to	  be	  the	  largest	  single	  contributing	  
factor	  in	  bringing	  on	  the	  war,	  because	  through	  it	  more	  than	  any	  other	  cause,	  
the	  mutual	  distrust	  among	  European	  Powers	  has	  been	  nurtured,	  until	  the	  
entire	  atmosphere	  of	  international	  diplomacy	  became	  vitiated.115	  	  
	  
Did	  the	  railway	  represent	  itself	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  German	  imperialism	  or	  a	  “friendship	  
mission”	  designed	  to	  benefit	  the	  Ottomans	  and	  Turco-­‐German	  relations?116	  Did	  
Germany	  seek	  out	  the	  railway	  project	  in	  order	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	  in	  terms	  of	  location	  and	  finances?	  Did	  Germany	  desire	  to	  use	  this	  
opportunity	  as	  a	  means	  to	  expand	  trade?	  Or	  rather,	  did	  it	  strengthen	  the	  Ottoman	  
Empire?	  	  
	  	   At	  the	  dawn	  of	  World	  War	  I	  in	  1914,	  the	  Baghdad	  railway	  project	  was	  only	  
partially	  completed.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  1940s	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  that	  
“the	  last	  unfinished	  section	  of	  the	  original	  ‘Berlin	  to	  Baghdad’	  railroad	  (in	  Iraq,	  south	  
of	  Mosul)	  was	  completed,	  and	  through-­‐train	  service	  all	  the	  way	  from	  the	  Bosporus	  
to	  Baghdad	  finally	  became	  a	  reality.”117	  By	  then	  the	  perspectives	  from	  the	  early	  
twentieth	  century	  had	  altered	  dramatically,	  and	  there	  were	  entirely	  new	  countries	  
involved.	  The	  completion	  and	  eventual	  fate	  of	  the	  railroad	  after	  the	  1940s	  is	  a	  topic	  
for	  further	  research.	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The	  study	  of	  the	  Berlin	  to	  Baghdad	  railway	  opens	  up	  the	  subject	  of	  other	  
railways	  built	  during	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Why	  were	  they	  built	  and	  
by	  whom?	  One	  example	  is	  the	  Hedjaz	  line,	  which	  was	  funded	  by	  public	  
contributions.	  
While	  Abdulhamid	  II	  desired	  for	  the	  Baghdad	  Railway	  to	  be	  his	  most	  
strategic	  endeavor,	  he	  “supplemented	  the	  Baghdad	  system	  with	  the	  famous	  Hedjaz	  
Railway	  –from	  Damascus	  to	  the	  holy	  cities	  of	  Medina	  and	  Mecca—one	  of	  the	  
achievements	  of	  which	  the…sultan	  was	  most	  proud.”118	  The	  engineers	  who	  worked	  
on	  the	  construction	  of	  this	  railroad	  were	  Italians,	  and	  nearly	  seven	  hundred	  
thousand	  people	  worked	  on	  this	  railroad.	  The	  railway	  was	  only	  completed	  to	  
Medina	  on	  August	  31,	  1908	  and	  never	  reached	  Mecca.	  
Another	  aspect	  of	  the	  railways	  besides	  the	  negotiations	  for	  their	  building	  and	  
financing	  was	  also	  the	  difficulty	  of	  maintaining	  them.	  One	  account	  describes	  several	  
types	  of	  challenge.	  
Even	  before	  World	  War	  I	  (1914–18)	  the	  Bedouins	  of	  the	  adjacent	  desert	  
areas	  attacked	  the	  railway,	  which	  challenged	  their	  control	  over	  the	  pilgrims’	  
route	  to	  the	  holy	  places	  from	  the	  north.	  When	  the	  Arabs	  of	  the	  Hejaz	  revolted	  
against	  Turkish	  rule	  in	  1916,	  the	  track	  between	  Maʿān	  and	  Medina	  was	  put	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out	  of	  operation	  by	  Arab	  raids,	  largely	  inspired	  by	  the	  British	  military	  
strategist	  T.E.	  Lawrence	  (Lawrence	  of	  Arabia).119	  	  
Not	  only	  the	  building	  but	  also	  the	  destruction	  of	  railways	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  is	  a	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